Introduction
To protect private keys, D o d i s et al. [2] introduced the key insulation mechanism in 2002. In a key-insulated cryptosystem, the helper keys are kept in a helper (a physically-secure, but computationally-limited device) while the temporary private keys are stored in a powerful but insecure device where cryptographic computations occur. The temporary private keys are refreshed at discrete times via interaction between the user and the helper, and the public key remains constant during the lifetime of the system. To enhance the security and flexibility of the key insulation mechanism, the idea of parallel key insulation [3, 6, 8, 9, 10] was put forward. In a parallel key-insulated cryptosystem, distinct independent helpers are alternatively used in key update operations.
Attribute-Based Signature (ABS) [4, 5, 7] is a kind of signature that manifests a pretension to the attributes that the underlying signer owns. Attribute-based signatures have many applications, such as attribute based messaging systems and anonymous authentication. In 2014 C h e n et al. [1] proposed an Attribute-Based Key-Insulated Signature (ABKIS), which is a crucial technique for protecting signing keys in ABS systems. Nevertheless, in Chen et al. scheme, where only one helper is used, if both the user's helper key and some of his temporary signing keys are exposed, the security of the signature system will be entirely lost.
To further enhance the security of the system by allowing frequent keyupdates without increasing the risk of helper key exposure, we extend the parallel key-insulated mechanism to attribute-based signature scenarios and give an Attribute-Based Parallel Key-Insulated Signature (ABPKIS) scheme which is provably secure in the standard model. Our proposed scheme is strongly keyinsulated, and even if one of a user's helper keys and some of his temporary signing keys are exposed, it is still impossible for an adversary to obtain all of this user's temporary signing keys. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first ABPKIS scheme up to now. Further on, this is also the first concrete attribute-based keyinsulated signature construction supporting multi-helpers.
Preliminaries
Throughout this paper, we let Z p denote the set {0, 1, 2,…, p−1} and Z * p denote Z p \{0}. For a finite set S, x U ← S means choosing an element x from S with a uniform distribution.
Bilinear pairings
Our ABPKIS scheme uses a bilinear map (pairing), ê : G 1 ×G 1 → G 2 , where G 1 is a multiplicative group with a prime order p and G 2 is also a multiplicative group with a prime order p. The pairing ê satisfies the following conditions:
• Bilinear: For all g 1 • Non-degenerate: There exist g 1 , g 2 ∈ G 1 such that ê (g 1 , g 2 ) ≠1.
• Computable: There is an efficient algorithm to compute (g 1 , g 2 ) for all
Computational Diffie-Hellman assumptions
An ABPKIS scheme consists of six algorithms:
• Setup(κ, l, d): Given a security parameter κ, the length l of some universe U, of size |U| and a threshold value d, the PKG runs this algorithm to output a master key (msk) and public parameters (cp).
• KeyGen(msk, cp, ω): Given the user's identity ω ⊆ U as a set representing the user's attributes, the public parameters cp and the master key msk, the PKG runs this algorithm to output an initial private key TK ω,0 and two helper keys (HK ω,0 , HK ω,1 ) that correspond to ω.
• HelperUpt(cp, t, ω, HK ω ): Given the public parameters cp, the period index t, an identity ω ⊆ U and its helper key HK ω , the helper runs this algorithm to output the key-update information for ω for a period t, UI ω,t .
• UserUpt(cp, t, ω, TK ω,t-1 ,UI ω,t , TK ω,t ): Given the public parameters cp, the period index t, an identity ω ⊆ U, the key-update information UI ω,t , and the temporary private key TK ω,t-1 that corresponds to ω and t -1, the user with identity ω runs this algorithm to output the temporary private key TK ω,t that corresponds to ω and t.
• Sign(cp, t, m, TK ω,t ): Given the public parameters cp, a period index t, a message m and a temporary private key TK ω,t , this algorithm outputs a signature (t, σ) with regard to the period index t, the attribute set ω′ ⊆ ω and message m.
• Verify(cp, m, ω′, (t, σ )): Given the public parameters cp, a message m, an attribute set ω′ and a signature (t, σ) with regard to the period t, an attribute set ω′ and message m, this algorithm outputs 1 if (t, σ) is a valid signature and 0 otherwise.
Security notions for ABPKIS
For convenience, we give the definition of a restricted identity as below: a restricted identity ω* satisfies α ⊆ ω*, where α is the challenge identity.
Key-insulated security
The key-insulated security notion captures the intuition that, if an adversary does not compromise the helper key for a given identity (i.e., an attribute set), then the exposure of any of the private keys does not enable an adversary to forge a valid signature for the non-exposed time periods.
Formally, for an ABPKIS scheme, its key-insulated security can be defined via the following game of existential unforgeability against a chosen identity and an adaptive chosen message attack under key-exposure (UF-ID&KE-CMA) between an adversary T and a challenger V.
• Init. The adversary declares the identity α, where |α|< d and d is the threshold and the time period index t * that he wishes to be challenged upon.
• Setup. The challenger V runs the Algorithm Setup and tells the adversary T the public parameters.
• 
Strongly key-insulated security
The strongly key-insulated security for ABPKIS systems says that, even if one of the user's helper keys and some of his temporary signing keys are exposed, it is still impossible for an adversary to obtain all of this user's temporary signing keys. Formally, for an ABPKIS scheme, its strongly key-insulated security can be defined via the following strongly-UF-ID&KE-CMA game between an adversary T and a challenger V:
• Init. The same as a UF-ID&KE-CMA game.
• Setup. The same as a UF-ID&KE-CMA game.
• Query Phase. The adversary T adaptively issues a set of queries, such as those given below: − Key Generation queries 〈ω 〉: The same as a UF-ID&KE-CMA game. − Helper Key queries 〈ω 〉: V runs algorithm KeyGen to generate HK ω and sends it to the adversary. − Signing queries 〈ω, t, m 〉: The same as a UF-ID&KE-CMA game.
• Output. Finally, T outputs an identity α, a period index t * and a corresponding signature (t * , σ * ). In the above game, it is also mandated that the following conditions are simultaneously satisfied: ① Verify(cp, (t
issue key generation queries for any restricted identity; ③ T is disallowed to issue signing queries for any restricted identity, the challenged time period t * and message m * .
Anonymity
An ABPKIS scheme satisfies the anonymity requirement if no adversary T can win the following ANONY-ABPKIS game between T and a challenger V with a non-negligible advantage:
• V runs the algorithm Setup to generate a master key msk and public parameters cp and sends them to T.
• T can use the master key msk to generate temporary private keys and signatures.
• T will next submit a challenge period index t * , a message m *, two identities (α 1 , α 2 ) and a challenge identity α, where α ⊆ (α 1 ∩ α 2 ) and |α| ≤ d.
• Assume that T has issued temporary private key queries 〈α 1 , t ) and sends it to T.
• Finally, T outputs a guess b ′ of b by judging whether (t * , σ * ) is generated We use a Pseudo-Random Function (PRF) [1] F, such that given a κ-bit seed (index) s and a κ-bit argument (input) x, it outputs a κ-bit string Fs(x), and defines the Lagrange coefficient
for i∈ Z p and a set S of elements in Z p . The proposed ABPKIS scheme consists of the following algorithms:
Given a security parameter κ, the length l of some universe U of size |U|, and a threshold value d, the PKG works as follows: ① Define the universe U. For simplicity, we can take the first l elements of Z 
In addition, for a given time period t and a given message m, we hereafter use W t and M m to denote the following sets:
KeyGen(msk, cp, ω): To generate the helper key and the initial private key for an identity ω ⊆ U, the PKG works as follows: (1) 
HelperUpt(cp, t, ω, HK ω ): Given the public parameters cp, the period indices t and t ′ , an identity ω ⊆ U, and its helper key HK ω , for each i ∈ ω , where ω =ω∪Ω, this algorithm computes k i,t = F HK ω (t||i) and k i,t-2 = F HK ω (t-2||i). Then this algorithm defines and returns the key-update information as follows:
This algorithm is executed by the user with identity ω ⊆ U and works as follows: (1) Parse the temporary private key for the identity ω and period t−1 as
(2) Parse the key-update information for the identity ω for t as 32, 
(4) Delete TK ω, t-1 and UI ω,t ; (5) Return TK ω, t . Note that if let î = t mod2 and ĵ = (t−1) mod2, then TK ω, t is always set to be
Sign(cp, t, m, TK ω, t ): Suppose that the signer has a temporary private key for the attribute set ω and time period t. In period t, the signer can produce the signature on m with the attribute set ω ′ = {i 1 , i 2 , …, i k }⊆ ω, where 1≤ k ≤ d, as follows: 
, the signature (t, σ ) is always set to be
This result can be seen from the following:
, 
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The consistency of this scheme can be explained as follows:
Security
Theorem 1. The proposed ABPKIS scheme is key-insulated in the Selective-ID model, assuming that the CDH assumption holds in group G 1 and the hash function H is collision-resistant. Concretely, if there exists a (T,ε)-UF-ID&KE-CMA adversary T against our scheme, asking at most q k (q t , q s , respectively) queries to the oracle of key generation queries (temporary private key queries, signature queries, respectively), then there exists an efficient algorithm U that can solve the the distribution of these public parameters is identical to the real construction. To make the notation easy to follow, we define four functions J 1 , J 2 , K 1 and K 2, such that
where S 1 ⊆{1, …, n w } and S 2 ⊆ {1, …, n m }. Note that the following equalities always hold:
. According to Equations (1) and (2) 
, and set the temporary private key components to be
Signing queries: Suppose U receives a signature query 〈ω, t, m 〉. If α ⊆ / ω, then U can generate a simulated temporary private key for 〈ω, t〉 to be a Temporary private key query and obtain a signature for 〈ω, t〉 on message m, normally. If
holds, then U outputs "failure" and aborts (denote this event by E3). Otherwise, U constructs the signature for T according to two cases
, and according to (3) , set the signature components to be ( 
s′ U ← Z p , and set the signature components to be
( ) ( )
, . 
Then, U can successfully compute g ab as
Game 2. In this game, U acts as a challenger expecting that T will corrupt exactly one of the helper keys on the challenged identity. U picks η U ← {0，1} and bets on that T queries on the η-th helper. We assume η = 1, the case of η = 0 can be handled in a similar manner). U provides the simulation of Setup, Key generation queries, Help key queries and Signing queries for T in the same way as Game 1. U provides Temporary Private Key queries for T as follows:
Temporary Private Key queries: we explain how to deal with the case of an even t (the case of an odd t can be handled in a similar manner). Since T does not know HK ω,0, U can compute k i,t-1 by KQuery. The other steps are the same as Temporary Private Key queries of Game 1.
We can see that U's running time is bounded by T ′ ≤ T +Ο((q k + q t + q s d)t e + + (n w (q k + q t ) + (n w + n m )q s d)t m ). The probability analysis is similar to [4] 
P r o o f:
The proof is the same as that of Theorem 1 except that: the temporary private key queries are no longer provided to T.
Theorem 3. The proposed ABPKIS scheme satisfies anonymity. P r o o f; First, the challenger V runs the algorithm Setup to obtain the public parameters cp and the master secret key msk = y. V also gives cp and msk = y to the adversary T.. After these interactions, the adversary outputs two identities ω 
